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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes employees' ability to select health insurance benefits that fit their needs.
The study analyzes both the actual choices and the implications of those choices for
employees, measured as out-of-pocket costs (OPC). By introducing OPC as a measure of
decision quality, this study demonstrates its advantages over measuring only employee choice.
Results from a sample of manufacturing employees suggest that most employees made
cost-optimizing decisions, out-performing recommendations from a linear model. Employees
also were financially better off overall with choice than they would have been had they all been
placed into either medical plan option available to them. This study supports the value of choice,
but does not support the assertion that employees always make benefits decisions that best fit
their needs.
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Flexible benefits plans are seen as a way of controlling benefits costs by changing from a
defined benefit to a defined contribution financing method (Employee Benefit Research Institute,
1991; Davis, Giles & Feild, 1988). Flexible benefits plans purportedly allow employees to
choose benefits to best meet their individual needs (Beam & McFadden, 1988; DeCenzo &
Holoviak, 1990; Rosenbloom & Hallman, 1981). Research on employee benefits decision
making has typically used rational decision making models to explain how employees make
their benefits choices (Feldman, Finch, Dowd, & Cassou, 1989; Friedman & Savage, 1948;
Friedman, 1974; Holmer, 1984). One measure of rationality is cost-minimization. Although no
one has proposed that employees always make cost-minimizing choices, no research has yet
examined whether actual employee benefit choices appear to reflect the desire and ability to
minimize costs. Some evidence suggests that employees may not make such choices. The task
of selecting benefits in a flexible benefits environment is difficult (Besser & Frank, 1989;
Mamorsky, 1990; McCaffery, 1992; Rosenbloom & Hallman, 1981), and many have observed
that humans are not always rational decision-makers (Baron, 1988; Bazerman, 1990; Rachlin,
1989; Thaler, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Employees' perceived needs may differ from
their actual needs. If employees make poor selections, this may produce higher than anticipated
costs and lower satisfaction (Rosenbloom & Hallman, 1981).
This study attempts to fill this gap by examining the assumption that employees know their
benefit needs and make choices that fit those needs. While flexible benefits plans are common,
the lack of a good measure of the consequences of decisions has limited the study of employee
decisions. In this paper, we introduce an analytical approach to help address this limitation and
to allow for more detailed study of employee decisions in a flexible benefits environment.
The analytical approach introduced here examines employee choices, but also the actual
cost implications of the choices. Each individual's out-of-pocket costs (OPC) are calculated to
determine how well the individual minimized expenses. This study introduces the use of OPC
comparisons and demonstrates how this measure allows researchers to explore a much richer
set of propositions than reliance only on information about benefit choices. We focus on health
care benefit decisions because health care has become a significant factor in current flexible
benefits approaches (Barringer, Milkovich & Mitchell, 1992), medical plans are frequently
included in cafeteria plans (EBRI, 1991), and medical insurance is seen by employees as one of
the most important benefits (Davis et al., 1988; Huseman, Hatfield & Robinson, 1978). The
issue of health care choice is also the focus of intense national debate. This study's data reflect
actual employee benefits choices, rather than simulated choices, thus providing useful field data
on actual employee behaviors. Moreover, using OPC allows researchers to examine the effects
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of benefit choices on both employee and employer costs. Boudreau (1991) has called for
extending cost-benefit logic to rewards systems. This study addresses this issue.
Decision Models For Benefits
"In a flexible benefits plan, individuals are allowed to choose their own reward package so
that it is sure to fit their needs and desires (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992, pg. 1046)." This fit between
benefit coverage and employee needs should help enhance employee satisfaction (Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1992). Yet it is unclear what this concept of "fit" means.
There are a number of possible interpretations of good fit. For some, fit may mean receiving
a certain quality of coverage, or access to a specific doctor. For others, fit may mean not having
to worry about the financial implications of a catastrophe. Any investigation of employee health
insurance benefit effects must begin with a clear definition of fit.
Like much research on employee choice under flex plans (Holmer, 1984; Barringer et al.,
1992), our definition of fit focuses on the financial implications (i.e. the out-of-pocket expenses)
of plan choice. Our data come from plans with identical levels of coverage and quality of service
but with varying methods of reimbursement. We propose that when employees must choose
between two plans that are equivalent in all ways except for premium, deductible, and
co-payment, fit can be measured by how well the chosen medical plan covers the medical costs
of the employee and his or her family. Therefore, assuming people desire to minimize
out-of-pocket expenses, we can construct a model of employee decision making for health care
plan decisions in a flexible benefits environment.
Rational Model
A purely rational model of decision making suggests that employees have consistent
preferences regarding the qualities of the medical plan they desire as well as reasonably
accurate estimates of their potential future medical costs (Bazerman, 1990; Hogarth, 1980).
Although the rational model does not presume that employees have perfect future knowledge
(Baron, 1988), the literature expounding the merits of flexible benefits plans has generally
assumed that individuals can generate a reasonably accurate estimate of their future medical
expenses. A rational model of employee health care benefits decision making, shown in Figure
1, suggests that an individual will estimate next year's medical expenses based on prior
expenses and personal characteristics, determine the OPC for each plan, and choose the plan
which minimizes their expected OPC. Flexible benefits become valuable to employees by
allowing those who expect lower future medical expenses to select a less comprehensive and
lower-premium plan while allowing those who predict higher future medical expenses to pay
higher premiums for a more comprehensive plan.
Out of Pocket Costs and Flexible Benefits                                                                                                                WP 94-05
Page 5
Figure 1:  Rational Model of Employee Choice
In the rational model of decision making, once an employee predicts his/her future medical
expenses, plan choice is simple and determinate. Because all the calculations are prescribed by
the specifics of the plan, the correlation between predicted medical expenses and predicted
OPC is perfect (i.e. 1.00), and the decision rule, "choose lowest predicted OPC" is
unambiguous. The extent to which future medical expenses can be predicted, though, limits the
ability of employees to make benefit decisions which truly fit their needs.
Recent research on the predictability of health care expenditures has proposed that, at
most, only 20 percent of the variance among individual, short-term, health care expenditures is
predictable (van Vliet, 1992). This low level of predictable variance seriously challenges the idea
that employees can choose plans which fit their needs. In Figure 1, the link between employee
characteristics and predicted medical expenses may be tenuous. Therefore we predict
H1: The percentage of employees making optimal decisions will
be significantly less than 100%.
The Value of Choice
If employees are unable to choose rationally, an obvious alternative to providing employees
with choice is to choose a medical plan for them. This strategy is not necessarily inconsistent
with the goal of helping employees control costs. For example, the employer could choose to
offer the single plan that minimizes the total expected costs for the entire employee population.
We will refer to this as the choose Plan A rule or choose Plan B rule because our data reflect a
situation with two alternatives. Although we do not believe employees make perfect decisions,
research on utility analysis has shown that low correlations can still have significant financial
implications (Boudreau, 1991). Van Vliet's (1992) findings suggest that one could achieve a
multiple correlation of up to 0.45 (Ö0.20) when predicting future medical expenses. Thus, we
predict
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H2: Actual employee decisions will more frequently be cost
optimal than if all employees were forced into either of 
two plans.
Linear Model versus Human Decision Making
A linear model can be constructed to implement the rational model presented in Figure 1.
This model follows the rational approach, but is limited by its inability to predict future medical
costs. We will refer to this process of making health plan choices by using a linear model to
predict the least cost alternative as the regression rule. The regression rule is normative rather
than descriptive, so it does not reflect the implications of bounded rationality (Simon, March &
Simon, 1958).
Bounded rationality means that while individuals try to make rational decisions, limitations of
intelligence, information, perceptions, and time constrain the ability of the decision maker to
reach the optimal decision (Bazerman, 1990). The task of selecting benefits from a cafeteria
style plan is complex (Besser & Frank, 1989; Mamorsky, 1990; McCaffery, 1992) and
employees often have little knowledge of their benefits (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; Milkovich,
Sturman, & Hannon, 1994). The medical benefits decision is thus bounded by the employee's
perception of future medical expenses, perception of the health care plans' qualities, and ability
to calculate the optimal decision. Although we would not expect the regression rule to make
optimal decisions 100% of the time, research comparing linear models to human decision
making provides some guidance regarding what may be expected.
Research comparing human decision makers to models has its longest history in clinical
psychology (Meehl, 1954), but similar research has been performed in a number of domains,
including medicine, polygraphy, security investment, legal adjudication, auditing, and
management (Kleinmuntz, 1990). Linear models might be expected to outperform human
decision makers because the models are more consistent, can more systematically take
advantage of underlying linear relationships found in specific data, and are not subject to a
number of biases which have been shown to impair human judgment (Baron, 1988; Bazerman,
1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1988). On the other hand, human decision makers might
potentially outperform linear models when the true relationship being modeled is non-linear,
when the linear model does not include all the necessary predictor variables and interactions, or
when there is insufficient sample size to build an accurate model (Baron, 1988). Research
comparing linear models to human decision-makers has shown that the linear models generally
outperform human decision-makers (Kleinmuntz, 1990; Meehl, 1954). Thus,
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H3: The proportion of cost-optimal employee decisions will be significantly less
than the proportion of cost- ptimal recommendations prescribed by the
regression rule.
OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS (OPC) AS A MEASURE OF DECISION QUALITY
Similar to past research, the first three hypotheses of this paper have only categorized
employees by their choice. When employees make "wrong" (not cost-op imal) decisions, this
may produce highly variable financial ramifications, depending on the interaction between their
medical costs and the plan's coverage. This fact cannot be reflected in traditional measures of
choice, or even by measures of the frequency of cost-optimal choices.
We now introduce out-of-pocket costs (OPC) as a way to capture the financial implications
of employee choice. Estimating OPC requires two pieces of information: (1) individual medical
charges, and (2) the medical cost reimbursement characteristics of the plan. For example,
suppose an employee pays a premium of $100 for a medical insurance plan that will pay 80% of
the first $1000 of medical expenses, and 100% thereafter. Such a plan creates an OPC function
that has a minimum of $100, rises by 0.20 for each dollar of medical expenses up to $1000, and
reaches a maximum of $300 (i.e. the $100 premium plus 0.20 times $1000). Similar functions
can be constructed for any medical plan.
Using this measure of OPC, we can calculate a measure of "regret," defined as the financial
consequence of making a non-cost-optimal choice. Given an indivi ual's actual medical cost
experience, we can calculate OPC for each available choice. If the employee chose the option
which minimizes their OPC, then "regret" equals zero. If the employee chose a different option,
regret equals the difference between the OPC of their chosen plan and the cost-minimizing
plan. Regret allows us to quantify the ramifications of making the "wrong" choice, which enables
us to determine for which employees the choice is most critical. Drawing on findings that it is
difficult to predict future medical costs (van Vliet, 1992), we predict
H4: Actual employee health care decisions will produce OPC
significantly greater than the potential minimum OPC.
Using OPC to Measure the Value of Choice
We have argued that employees face formidable challenges to making cost-optimal
decisions, but we are not proposing that choice offers no value. Flexible benefits plans are
based on the premise that employees can make good choices (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992). If this
premise has merit, we would expect that
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H5: The OPC of actual employee decisions will be less than the OPC resulting from
forcing all employees into either Plan A or Plan B.
While we expect choice to have value to employees, linear models frequently out-perform
human decision-makers (Meehl, 1954; Kleinmuntz, 1990). Thus we predict,
H6: The OPC of actual employee decisions will be greater than the OPC of
recommendations from the regression rule.
Finally, individuals may differ in the quality of their choices. Employees do perceive health
care decisions as important (Davis, et al., 1988; Huseman et al., 1978), and research has
shown that some employees spend considerable time making their benefits decisions
(Milkovich, Sturman, & Hannon, 1994). Employees whose choice is most consequential are
those facing the highest regret if they are wrong. This high level of potential regret may motivate
greater effort, and therefore greater cost-optimality. Thus,
H7: Maximum potential "regret" will be higher for those who made optimal
decisions than for those who did not.
METHOD
Sample
These data describe employees of a medium sized manufacturing firm. This firm, employing
roughly 650 employees, has three plants, one of which offers a choice of medical plans. The
flexible medical choice began in 1991. Data on employee choices, medical billings, and
demographic characteristics were collected for 1991 and 1992 from the plant which offers the
flex plan, and employed roughly 340 people in each year. Data were collected on individuals
employed for both of these years. The company provided data on age, marital status, number of
children, and plan choice for 314 employees. Information on medical billings was acquired from
the medical insurance company, and yielded 287 overlapping cases. The average employee
age was 34 years, 63% were male, 78% were married, and each employee had roughly 2
children (mean = 1.7; ranging from 0 - 7).
Medical Plans
Prior to 1991, the employer enrolled all employees in a single medical benefits plan, Plan A.
Beginning in 1991, the firm offered a new medical plan option, Plan B, at this plant. Both Plan A
and Plan B are fee-for-service type plans. The plans are identical in their co-payment and
maximum payment amount. Premium and deductible levels differ across plans. The two plans
also differ with regard to coverage of some medical claims. Plan A covers the full cost of up to
120 days of hospitalization and hospital treatments (e.g. hospital stays, surgery, etc.). Plan B
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treats these claims similarly to any other type of claim by paying 80% of the expense after a
deductible is met and 100% of the expense after the employee has exceeded a specific
out-of-pocket maximum.
Measures
Three dependent categories reflect the number of dependents covered by the medical plan
(i.e. 0, 1, or more than 1). Each plan has a different premium for each dependent category. OPC
was calculated for each employee under each plan based on their total medical expenses (e.g.
hospital and non-hospital), plan deductible, and plan premium. If the OPC for the employee's
chosen plan was less than or equal to the OPC of the non-chosen plan, then the decision was
cost optimal and regret was equal to zero. Otherwise, regret equaled the difference between
these two values.
Employees' actual choices were coded as 0 if the employee chose Plan A and 1 for Plan B.
A variable, "optimal choice" represented the cost-minimizing choice for each situation. It too was
coded as 0 if Plan A was the cost optimal choice, and 1 if Plan B was the cost optimal choice for
that individual. A new variable, "emp-optimal," was created, calculated as one minus the
absolute value of the difference between employees' actual choices and the corresponding
values of "optimal choice." When an employee's decision was optimal, "emp-optimal" would
equal 1; otherwise, it would equal 0.
Two variables were created to represent the optimality of the choose Plan A rule and the
choose Plan B rule: "A-optimal" and "B-optimal." For each employee, A-optimal was coded as 1
if Plan A was the cost-minimizing choice, and 0 otherwise. B-optimal was coded as 1 if Plan B
was the cost-minimizing choice, and 0 otherwise.
To test the hypotheses involving the linear model, we regressed 1992 medical expenses on
age, gender, marital status, number of children, and 1991 medical expenses. This regression
also enabled us to compare the variance explained in this study to the finding that the variance
in individual health care costs explained by individual and other characteristics has rarely
exceeded 20 percent (van Vliet, 1992). Note that the log of 1991 and 1992 medical claims were
used in the regression calculation so that the distributions would be better approximate
normality, and thus conform to the assumptions of ordinary least squares regression (Neter,
Wasserman, & Whitmore, 1988).
If employee decisions resembled the regression rule, employees would choose the plan
which would minimize OPC for the predicted value of 1992 expenses. For each employee, a
variable was created called "reg-choice", coded 0 when the predicted 1992 expense level would
make Plan A optimal, and 1 when predicted 1992 expenses made Plan B optimal. To determine
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the optimality of the regression rule, a new variable "reg-optimal" was calculated as one minus
the absolute value of the difference between "reg choice" and "optimal choice" for each case.
This variable equaled one when the regression-based choice was optimal and zero otherwise.
The OPC were calculated for actual employee decisions, the optimal decisions, the
regression rule, the choose Plan A rule, and the choose Plan B rule. The maximum potential
regret was also computed for each individual.
Analysis
Hypothesis one was tested using a t-test. Support for the first hypothesis would be indicated
by a sample mean of "emp-o timal" statistically less than one.
Two t-tests can be used to determine if actual employee choices are more cost- ptimal
than each of the rules. These tests entail comparing "emp-opti al" to "A-optimal," and
"emp-optimal" to "B-optimal." Support for the second hypothesis is indicated f "emp-optimal" is
significantly greater in each case.
Hypothesis three predicts that the regression rule will have a higher frequency of
cost-optimality. Thus we expect the mean value of "reg-optimal" to be significantly greater than
the mean value of "emp-o timal".
The fourth hypothesis suggests that employee regret, OPC resulting from actual employee
decisions minus the OPC of cost-optimal choices, will be significantly greater than zero. The fifth
hypothesis can be tested by comparing OPC from the choose Plan A rule to actual OPC, and
comparing OPC from the choose plan B rule to actual OPC. Hypothesis five is supported if
actual OPC is lower in each case.
A t-test is also used to test the sixth hypothesis. Support is indicated if actual OPC is
significantly greater than the regression rule's OPC.
The final hypothesis can be analyzed with a t-test. This hypothesis predicts that the average
level of maximum potential regret for those who cost-minimized is greater than the average for
those who did not cost-minimize.
Results
The frequency of plan choices is shown in Table 1. In 1991, 77% chose Plan A, 23% chose
Plan B. In 1992, 78% chose Plan A, and 22% chose Plan B. Of those choosing Plan A, 55%
made cost-optimal decision in each year. Of those choosing Pla  B, 64% made optimal choices
in 1991, while 92% of those choosing Plan B in 1992 made optimal choices. Including both
plans, the proportion of optimal decisions was 57% in 1991, and 63% in 1992, for a combined
optimality level of 60% across both years. Although the proportion of optimal decisions
increased, it was not significantly different, suggesting that decision quality did not change from
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1991 to 1992. Univariate tests of mean differences on individual characteristics revealed that,
although mean age and gender did not differ between the cost-optimal decision makers and the
non-cost-optimal decision makers, there were significant differences (p < 0.05) in terms of
marital status (cost-optimal decision makers were more frequently married) and number of
children (cost-optimal decision makers had, on average, more children). There were no
significant differences, though, in terms of age, gender, marital status, and number of children
between those who chose Plan A and those who chose Plan B.
Table 1:  Actual Employee Enrollment Patterns
Not
Cost-Optimal Cost-Optimal
Plan A 1991 120 100
Plan B 1991 43  24
Plan A 1992 123 101
Plan B 1992 58 5
Hypothesis #1 is supported, in that employees did not make perfectly optimal decisions.
The proportion of non-optimal decisions across both plans, in both years is 40%, which is
significantly greater than zero (t=11.15; one-tailed p<0.0001). However, employee choices were
also not completely sub-optimal, as the correlation between employee choices and optimal
choices was positive (r=0.391; p>0.0001).
Hypothesis #2 was supported for the choose Plan A rule. If every employee had chosen
Plan A in both years, 47% of the decisions would have been cost-optimal (50% in 1991 and
44% in 1992). This proportion is significantly less than the 60% proportion of optimal actual
decisions (t=7.253; one-tailed p<0.0001). However, Hypothesis #2 was not supported for the
choose Plan B rule. If all employees had chosen Plan B in both years, 53% of the decisions
would have been cost-optimal (50% in 1991 and 55% in 1992). This proportion is not
significantly less than the 60% proportion of optimal actual decisions (t=1.473; one-tailed p =
0.1419).
To apply the regression rule, we first developed the regression equation predicting 1992
medical expenses from the available individual characteristics, including 1991 medical
expenses. The results of the regression are shown in Table 2. The F-test suggests that the
equation predicts a significant proportion of variance, and the R-squared of 0.15 is consistent
with research on the amount of predictability of short-term health care costs (van Vliet, 1992).
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Two predictors contributed significantly: Number of Children and the log of 1991 Medical Claims
were both positively related to the log of 1992 Medical Expenses.
Table 2
Predicting log (1992 Medical Expenses)
Independent b Standard Error T-Ratio
Variables of b
Constant 0.910944 0.3602 2.53
Gender (Female = 1) -0.065045 0.1710 -0.380
Marital Status (Married =1) 0.314554 0.2516 1.25
Number of Children 0.132934 0.0619 2.15*
Age -0.001669 0.0094 -0.177
log(1991 Medical Claims) 0.278923 0.0609 4.58**
R2 0.154
Adj. R2 0.139




*p< 0.05; **p <  0.01
Applying the regression weights shown in Table 2 to each employee produced 287
predicted values for 1992 Medical Expenses. Using these predicted values to determine the
choice of medical plan, 259 employees "chose" Plan A and 28 employees "chose" Plan B. Of
those choosing Plan A, 61% were optimal, while of those choosing Plan B, 58% were optimal,
producing an overall regression rule optimal-choice level of 59%. Hypothesis #3 was not
supported, as the "Regression Rule" optimality proportion of 59% was in fact lower than the
63% optimal-choice level achieved by employees' actual 1992 decisions. Although actual
employee decisions are more frequently optimal than decisions based on the regression rule,
the t-test suggests that these two proportions are not significantly different (t=1.111; p<0.2666).
The results of the first three hypothesis tests suggest that employees' choices are imperfect,
but not completely incorrect. However, results based only on the frequency of optimality provide
no information on the consequences of wrong decisions. Table 3 summarizes the optimality
frequencies and consequences of actual employee decisions for each year, as well as for the
three decision rules. Note that the standard deviation in Row 14 is zero. This results from OPC
being calculated using only hospital claims, because both plan reimburse other expenses
equally. Because Plan A covers 100% of hospital claims, OPC is based solely on the premium.
The regression rule only recommended Plan A for those in dependent category 3. Thus, OPC is
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based on cost of this premium, and the standard deviation equals 0. Note that this is also why
the means and standard deviations are equal in Rows 8, 9 and 10. Again, because Plan A OPC
is based solely on premium, and because there were the same number of people in each
dependent category in each year, the Plan A rule yields the same mean OPC and standard
deviations in each year.
Table 3
Frequency and Cost of Non-Optimal Employee Benefit Decisions
Number Percent Mean Mean
N Non-Optimal Non-Optimal OPC Regret
(SD) (SD)
Actual Plan A,1991 220 100 45% 480 111
(103) (146)
Actual Plan B,1991 67 24 36% 478 189
(521) (385)
Actual A and B,1991 287 124 43% 480 129
(266) (227)
Actual Plan A,1992 224 101 45% 479 106
(104) (140)
Actual Plan B,1992 63 5 8% 213 27
(220 (118)
Actual A and B,1992 287 106 37% 420 88
(176) (139)
Actual A and B, 1991 and 1992 574 230 40% 450 109
(227) (189)
"Choose Plan A" Rule, 1991 287 143 50% 477 127
(106) (151)
"Choose Plan A" Rule, 1992 287 159 55% 477 145
(106) (155)
"Choose Plan A" Rule, 574 302 53% 477 136
     1991 and 1992 (106) (153)
"Choose Plan B" Rule, 1991 287 144 50% 745 395
(756) (638)
"Choose Plan B" Rule, 1992 287 128 46% 606 274
(647) (533)
"Choose Plan B" Rule, 574 272 47% 676 335
     1991 and 1992 (706) (590)
"Regression Rule", Plan A 41 16 39% 530 109
     (1992 Only) (0) (151)
"Regression Rule", Plan B 246 103 42% 547 230
     (1992 Only) (596) (483)
"Regression Rule", A and B 287 119 41% 545 213
     (1992 Only) (551)  (452)
Note: OPC = Out-of-pocket costs; Regret = Actual OPC minus Cost-Minimal OPC
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The rows of Table 3 correspond to the different choices or choice rules, and the two different
years. The first three rows reflect the results based on the actual choices for those employees
who chose Plan A in 1991, those who chose Plan B in 1991, and the combined sample for
1991. The second three rows show the same information for the year 1992. The seventh row
shows the combined sample for both plans in both years. Rows eight through ten show the
results of assuming that every employee chose Plan A. Row eight reflects the results for 1991,
row nine shows results for 1992, and Row ten shows the combined results for both years. Rows
eleven through thirteen are similar, except that the decision rule assumes that all employees
chose Plan B. The last three rows of Table 3 show the results for the regression-rule choice
described above. Note that because 1991 medical costs were used as an input to the
regression rule, the "Regression" rows reflect only the 1992 sample. For each choice or rule, the
columns of Table 3 show the number of employees making non-cost- ptimal decisions, the
proportion of the decisions that were (or would have been) non-optimal, the mean and standard
deviation of out-of pocket costs (OPC), and the mean and standard deviation of Regret, defined
as the difference between the OPC produced by the actual choice less the OPC of the optimal
choice.
The pattern of results suggests that actual employee behavior produced roughly equal or
lower proportions of non- ptimal choices than any of the decision rules, as noted earlier.
However, the results also suggest that augmenting such proportions with OPC and Regret more
fully captures the consequences. For example, although the proportion of non- ptimal choices
under the "Choose Plan A" rule for the two combined years (53%) is higher than the
corresponding proportion for the "Choose Plan B" rule (47%), the OPC and Regret for the
"Choose Plan A" rule are substantially lower than those for the "Choose Plan B" rule. This is
because the average cost consequences of being wrong by choosing Plan A are lower than the
average cost consequences of being wrong by choosing Plan B.
Hypothesis #4 was supported. If employees had made choices that minimized OPC, the
average level of Regret would be zero. As Table 3 shows, the level of Regret was never
precisely zero in any of the first seven rows reflecting actual employee decisions. Mean Regret
was significantly different from zero for actual choices encompassing both plans in 1991 and
1992. Mean Regret for both plans over both years (Row 7 in Table 3) was significantly greater
than zero (p < 0.0001). These results suggest that employee choices are not always cost
minimizing.
These Regret levels translate into substantial consequences for the entire 287employee
sample in each year. For example, even the lowest mean Regret level for the employee
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population ($88 in Row 6) translates into a total over-spending of $25,256 per year. Where
mean Regret is higher, the level of employee overspending is proportionately higher. Thus, it is
important to examine whether providing choice is truly advantageous to employees.
Hypothesis #5 proposed that the mean OPC of actual employee decisions would be less
than the mean OPC produced by the "Choose Plan A" and "Choose Plan B" decision rules. This
hypothesis received mixed support. Considering only 1991 choices, the "Choose Plan A" rule
did not yield a significantly different OPC than that yielded from actual choices ($480 in Row 3
versus $477 in Row 8); however, the OPC from actual choices was significantly lower than the
"Choose Plan A" rule in 1992 ($420 in Row 6 versus $477 in Row 8), and actual OPC was lower
than the "Choose Plan B" rule in both years. Finally, considering the combined choices from
both 1991 and 1992, the mean OPC of actual decisions was $450, the mean OPC for "Choose
Plan A" was $477, and the mean OPC for "Choose Plan B" was $676. Paired-sample t-tests
revealed that the OPC of actual decisions was indeed significantly lower than mean OPC for the
"Choose Plan A" rule (t=3.259; one-tailed p<0.001), and for the "Choose Plan B" rule (t=8.431;
one-tailed p<0.0001). It is interesting to note that using OPC reveals the superiority of employee
choice over the "Choose Plan B" rule for the combined two-year analysis, despite the fact that
the proportion of optimal decisions from this rule (53%) was not significantly different from the
proportion of actual optimal decisions (60%).
Hypothesis #6 proposed the superiority of the "Regression" rule for minimizing OPC.
Because the "Regression" rule uses 1991 benefits claims as input, only 1992 choices can be
analyzed. Hypothesis #6 was not supported. In fact, the results are significant in the opposite
direction as expected. Considering Plan A choices or Plan B choices separately, the regression
rule yields a significantly higher OPC than actual plan A (t = 7.451) or Plan B decisions (t =
7.102). Finally, considering the combination of Plan A and Plan B, the mean OPC of the
"Regression" rule was $545, which is significantly greater (t=2.799, p<0.01) than the mean OPC
of actual employee decisions ($450).
Hypothesis #7 proposed that employees making optimal decisions are averting greater
levels of potential "Regret" than those who make non-cost-optimal choices.  Across the entire
two-year sample, those who cost-minimized avoided an average "Regret" level of $524, while
those who did not cost-minimize experienced an average "Regret" level of $239. The
cost-minimizing employees had a significantly higher level of avoided "Regret" (t=6.457;
one-tailed p<0.0001).
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DISCUSSION
This study supports the proposition that most employees are able to select benefits that best
fit their needs. In a situation where employees were given a choice of medical plans that were
similar in all ways except the premium, deductible, and method of reimbursement, employees
made cost-optimizing decisions 60% of the time on average over two years. Further, these data
suggest that employees are able to choose the least-cost alternative despite the difficulty of the
decisions, and that the actual employee decisions outperform even those based on a linear
regression model. Yet, the present results also suggest that employee choices are not perfect. It
does not appear that when provided with benefits choices, "individuals can choose their own
reward package so that it is sure to fit their needs and desires (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992, pg.
1046, emphasis added)." Indeed, 40% of employees did not make costs minimizing decisions,
with a mean regret of $271. Although regret was as low as $2, it ranged as high as $2040, and
its median was $255. In all, regret amounted to an average total overpayment of $31,283 per
year.
Reasons for Employee Choice
This study, like other research on flexible benefits decision making, focuses on what
decisions employees make. It is also important to address why employees make these
decisions. This study does not intend, nor do we have the data, to provide a detailed analysis of
this question. However, we can draw some exploratory evidence from the available data.
Table 4 shows the data illustrating three decision strategies that may cause employees to
favor one option over the other: focus on premium (i.e. choose the lowest premium plan),
choose the plan with minimum expected OPC, and choose the plan that minimizes the
maximum possible OPC (minimize worst-case risk). If employees focused exclusively on
premium, then everyone would have chosen Plan B. However, if employees based their
decisions exclusively on expected OPC, then those in dependent category 1 and 2 would
choose Plan B (27%), and those in dependent category 3 would choose Plan A (72%).






(Employee (Employee + 1 (Employee +
Only) Dependent) >1 Dependents)
Plan A $231.36 $461.28 $530.40
Premium Plan B $79.56 $80.64 $170.52
$231.36 $461.28 $530.40
Mean OPC Plan A* (0) (0) (0)
(SD) $180.26 $447.65 $723.10
Plan B (203.23) (567.96) (677.74)
Worst-Case Risk Plan A $231.36 $461.28 $530.40
Plan B $946.18 $2480.60 $2570.50
Actual 1991 Plan A 31 26 163
Employee 1991 Plan B 12 9 46
Choices 1992 Plan A 32 29 163
(N) 1992 Plan B 11 8 44
*Note: The OPC associated with Plan A is its Premium. This is because OPC in this study is calculated
using only hospital claims (both plans reimburse other expenses equally), and Plan A covers 100% of
hospital claims. Thus, the standard deviation associated with Plan A OPC within dependent category is 0.
If employees only looked at the worst-ca e scenario, then all employees would have chosen
Plan A. In all, 77% of the employees chose Plan A. This suggests that employee decisions are
concerned with worst-case risk, but it is impossible to tell with these data how employees
actually make their decisions. The fact that employee choices are not consistent with a
significant emphasis on premiums is somewhat inconsistent with other research in this area
(Barringer et al., 1992) and deserves further study.
LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study offers the first empirical test of whether actual employee benefit decisions
achieve cost-optimality. Nonetheless, there are some limitations which offer fruitful opportunities
for further replication. These results reflect only a single plant in one company.
Organization-specific factors such as the way the benefit plans were described, previous
company history regarding what health-c re options were offered, and the particular individual
characteristics of this sample may have affected the present findings. Still, many organizations
offer medical benefit insurance options similar to the ones studied here, the employee group is
not atypical in terms of age, marital status and gender, and the results appear to replicate some
previous research findings (van Vliet, 1992). While future research should certainly explore the
generality of these findings, it does not appear that they are idiosyncratic.
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Data limitations prevented us from fully implementing a comprehensive linear model. One
key limitation was the availability of only one previous year's medical claims. A linear model
based on a longer history may well prove more effective in predicting future medical claims. The
data on employee characteristics was also limited. Information on anticipated future medical
events, such as elective surgery, births, etc. might well have improved the predictive power of
the linear model.
Finally, because the data are archival, we have no information on the actual decision
processes followed by employees. While we can speculate about the apparent motivations for
the observed decisions, clearer explanations of employee choice behavior will be possible when
data on both the processes and the outcomes of employee decisions can be gathered.
It is possible that employee medical claims and plan choice are recursively related. Once
employees choose a certain plan, they may alter their behavior to better fit that plan's
characteristics. For example, those opting for a high-coverage, high-premium plan may increase
their use of covered services to "get their money's worth." Thus, the cost-optimali y levels
observed here may be a function of both the choice process and subsequent behavior changes.
The present data contained only a small number of plan "switchers" [N=8], so it was not
possible to test this possibility here.
Despite these limitations, the results of the present study have both practical and
research implications. The patterns observed suggest several fruitful avenues for future
investigation.
Practical Implications
This study introduced OPC and Regret as measures of benefit decision quality, providing
the first attempt to combine actual medical claims with employee choices. As shown,
information from these two new variables revealed decision patterns that were not apparent
from the choices alone, and provided a measure of the monetary implications of employee
choices. The data required to estimate OPC and Regret are frequently available, but require
cooperation between insurance carriers and companies. Moreover, the data analysis method
introduced here is quite different from the typical approach to benefits information, which
emphasizes the administrative requirements of government or insurance agencies, focuses only
on total costs, or focuses on identifying health-c re providers whose costs may be exorbitant.
Boudreau (1991, 1992) and Broderick & Boudreau (1991, 1992) have proposed that human
resource information and systems should consider not only the administrative cost-savings
achievable by information, but its value in supporting decisions. Managers may well find the
concepts of OPC and Regret useful in identifying the success or failure of organizational efforts
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to help employees tailor their benefits choices to their individual needs. It may also make it
possible to identify groups of employees who seem particularly prone to non-cost-optimal
decisions, allowing the organization to target its communications and decision assistance more
precisely to those for whom it provides the most benefit.
A substantial number of employees made non-cost-optimal decisions. This finding, if
replicated in other situations, suggests that there may be substantial value in effective
organizational education efforts to help employees improve their decisions. The present study
offers some guidance in this effort. It appears that the probability of making cost-optimal
decisions increases with the consequences of being non-cost-optimal. Though we could not test
this directly, such results suggest that employees are aware of the cost implications of their
decisions, at least above some threshold level, and that they do respond by making cost-optimal
decisions when the consequences are high. Organizations might induce even higher rates of
cost-optimal decision making by providing information specifically designed to highlight cost
consequences. The results also show that the most frequently chosen benefits plan (Plan A)
carried the highest premium but the lowest worst-case risk. This may suggest benefit plan
factors that are most significant in employee choices, and may help organizations determine
how to help employees focus on the most appropriate and useful plan characteristics. Research
has suggested that combinations of linear models and human decision-makers can outperform
either used alone (Kleinmuntz, 1990). While research on decision aids for benefit decisions is
relatively new (Besser & Frank, 1989; Milkovich, Sturman & Hannon, 1993), the use of OPC to
describe decision patterns may well assist in the development of such systems in the future.
In the present study, we found that forcing all employees into one plan or the other would
not have produced lower OPC levels than the employees attained by making their own choices.
It appears that choice provided value in this case. However, this outcome may be a result of the
particular plan characteristics implemented here, or of specific organizational characteristics.
Further replication is needed to determine the relative effects of these different factors, so that
benefits managers can better construct plans that optimize employee ability to achieve "fit"
between their needs/desires and the outcomes of their benefits.
However, we should note that such a "fit" carries costs for the organization. The organization
in this study, like most organizations, was self-in ured. Thus, any medical costs not paid by
employees are paid by the organization. The more cost-optimal employee decisions, the more
of the medical expenses are borne by the organization, rather than the employees. Such costs
may be offset by improved employee motivation, attitudes and commitment resulting from the
ability to tailor benefits to their needs. This suggests a "utility analysis" framework for employee
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benefits (Boudreau, 1991). Implementing such a framework requires a comprehensive estimate
of costs, and the introduction of OPC makes such an estimate more feasible.
Future Research Implications
Future research might address the antecedents and consequences of cost-optimality in
employee benefits decisions. The present data provided only very limited information about
employee characteristics that might influence benefit choices. Future research might examine
whether individual characteristics such as knowledge of benefits plans, risk- version, cognitive
ability, and motivation predict the likelihood of cost-minimization. OPC may also prove fruitful in
measuring the effectiveness of interventions to improve benefits decision making, such as
expert systems, benefits counseling, benefits communication, training and goal setting. Such
research can investigate the frequency of cost-optimality, but adding the cost consequences will
provide a richer set of measures to define the concept of optimality in decision making. A key
antecedent to cost-optimality may be individual employee decision processes. To date, we have
very little knowledge about the factors employees consider when making benefits decisions, or
whether certain decision patterns result in more cost-optimal outcomes. The analysis approach
introduced here can provide more detailed information about these outcomes.
Regarding the consequences of benefits decisions, the present analysis suggested that the
frequency of correct decisions can mask more complex patterns, and that the use of OPC can
help to reveal them. It appears that the magnitude of the cost consequences is correlated with
the probability of making cost- p imal decisions. However, future research is needed to
determine whether achieving cost-optimality affects employee attitudes and behaviors. Are
cost-optimal employees more satisfied, motivated or committed? Do they perform better? Do
employees alter their behaviors to "fit" the benefits they have chosen, or do they attempt to
choose benefits that fit their planned behaviors? Are employees who make non-cost-optimal
decisions more likely to seek assistance with future decisions, or more likely to change their
future decisions?
Finally, the use of OPC allows a direct comparison between the benefits costs borne by the
employer and those borne by the employees, for employers who "self-insure". Research on the
reasons managers adopt human resource interventions is rare (Florin-Thuma & Boudreau,
1987; Boudreau & Berman, 1991), and requires estimating the consequences of those
decisions for both the employees and the organization. OPC offers a common scale, dollar cost,
that may allow direct comparisons of employee and employer consequences. It can also provide
a tangible dollar-valued basis for comparing other benefit consequences such as improved
motivation, performance and attitudes.
Out of Pocket Costs and Flexible Benefits                                                                                                                WP 94-05
Page 21
Choosing benefits is complex and difficult for both employers and employees. The present
research offers the first empirical evidence of the cost consequences of employee choices, and
suggests that while employee choices are far from perfect, offering choice appears to result in
improved cost-optimization. By introducing OPC as an addition to more traditional variables
reflecting the frequency of benefit choices, it is hoped that future research will be able to better
describe, predict and explain this important process.
1. The authors would like to thank Theresa Welbourne and Renae Broderick for their helpful
comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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